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Was Gramsci a Marxist?
Joel Wainwright
This paper argues that Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is rooted in Marx’s
theory of value. Although value theory, and Marx’s economic writings more generally,
are by no means central themes of the Prison Notebooks, they nevertheless shape
Gramsci’s theoretical disposition and political analysis in fundamental respects.
Thus, Gramsci’s critique of economism should be seen as an extension of Marx’s
critique of political economy.
Key Words: Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Value Theory, Fordism
At the 2009 meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Maurice
Finocchiaro, distinguished professor of philosophy emeritus at the University of
Nevada at Las Vegas (and author of two books on Gramsci: Finocchiaro 1988, 1999),
was invited to respond to a series of papers presented by a group of self-styled
Gramscian geographers, present author included. Finocchiaro opened his remarks by
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questioning our interpretation of Gramsci as a Marxist. ‘‘What makes Gramsci a
Marxist?’’ Finocchiaro thundered, and not a few geographers replied by promptly
leaving the conference room. I saw a few quizzical smiles that seemed to suggest they
thought our friendly guest philosopher was off his rocker. Who doesn’t know that
Gramsci was a Marxist? Yet, no one bothered to answer Finocchiaro’s question.
For his part, Finocchiaro made some strong arguments. Point one: the concepts the
geographers were claiming to draw from Gramsci*/hegemony, in particular*/are far
removed from Marx. Point two: as is quite clear from reading his Prison Notebooks,
Gramsci abandoned many of the substantive tenets of Marx’s texts. For instance,
Gramsci plainly disagreed with Marx’s argument*/in the Communist Manifesto and
Capital*/that capitalism’s own contradictions would inevitably lead to proletarian
revolution. Thus, Finocchiaro reasoned, Gramsci’s purported Marxism can only be
construed as methodological. But, point three, methodologically Gramsci’s real debt
was to Hegel (via Marx and Croce). Gramsci inherited this dialectical lineage. We
cannot pluck Marx out of this trio to claim that ‘‘Gramsci was methodologically a
Marxist’’ unless we add ‘‘as well as a Hegelian and a Crocean.’’ But this diminishes the
claim because neither Hegel nor Croce was a communist revolutionary, to put it mildly.
While I cannot accept Finocchiaro’s framing of the issue*/particularly since he left
out the possibility that Gramsci could be a Marxist on political grounds*/I think he
raises an important question:
The question is whether Gramsci is a Marxist, or to be more precise in what
sense or to what extent he is a Marxist . . . The interpretation of Gramsci as a
Marxist . . . may seem to some as so obvious and incontrovertible that it
hardly needs mentioning or remarking upon. In my opinion, however, this
question deserves discussion. The interpretation of Gramsci as a Marxist is
one-sided at best because it is equally important to understand other
aspects of Gramsci relating to Benedetto Croce, Machiavelli, and Gaetano
Mosca. (Finocchiaro 2009, 2/3)
In raising this question, Finocchiaro is not alone. His arguments resound in
counterpoint with another acute Italian reader of Gramsci, Emanuele Saccarelli.
Yet whereas Finocchiaro, a Crocean philosopher of science, would like us to
interpret Gramsci as a classic thinker who may be read in a plurality of ways (i.e.,
not exclusively as a Marxist), Saccarelli, a Trotskyist political philosopher,
encourages us to depart from Gramsci altogether since, in his view, Gramsci fails
to offer any important, novel Marxist ideas (see Saccarelli 2008). Thus, Finocchiaro
celebrates Gramsci by arguing that he was not mainly or exclusively a Marxist;
Saccarelli condemns Gramsci, contending that he was insufficiently Marxist (and
insufficiently Trotskyist). This is an important and incisive pair of critiques. You can
argue with one or the other, but between them Finocchiaro and Saccarelli cut away,
scissorslike, much of what passes as Gramscian scholarship. They leave someone who
feels that Gramsci was a Marxist, and one with important insights for our time, with
little ground on which to stand.
In this paper I attempt to reply to Finocchiaro (I cannot address Saccarelli’s criticisms
of Gramsci here). I argue that while Gramsci, like most Marxists, did not agree with
some of the particulars of Marx’s arguments, he never wavered in emphasizing
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the necessity of Marx’s core theoretical contribution for the analysis of capitalist
society: the theory of value. Not only does his emphasis on Marx’s theory of
value*/alone*/demonstrate that Gramsci was indeed a Marxist, but it also clarifies
aspects of his theory of hegemony.
1
If one wishes to see how Gramsci uses ‘value’ (It., valore) by scanning his writings,
looking for each instance where he employs the word, a complication arises. Most of
his uses of the word ‘value’ concern the worth of things in a noneconomic sense.
To take but one instance, consider this passage:
[T]he workers’ Factory Council is the first step in a historical process that
should lead eventually to the Communist International, no longer as a
political organization of the revolutionary proletariat, but as a reorganiza-
tion of the world economy and of the whole human community . . . The value
and historical reality of every revolutionary action today depends on
whether it fits into this process, and is designed successfully to free it
from the bourgeois superstructures that restrict and obstruct it. (1920, 264)
Gramsci’s argument here*/that the value of revolutionary activities should
be measured against their contribution to the ‘‘reorganization of the world econo-
my’’*/is unmistakably Marxist, and we could reply to Finocchiaro’s question on such a
basis (I will return to this in my conclusion). But I cite this passage to provide one of the
many illustrations of Gramsci’s axiological uses of ‘value’, meaning here ‘worth’ in a
noneconomic sense. In fact, his Prison Notebooks could be accurately described as a
compendium of evaluations of the concepts or practices (Italian folklore, Pirandello’s
theatre, Croce’s philosophy, and so on) that may or may not be useful for the project of
building communist hegemony. Gramsci was quite assertive about the relative value of
these things. When Gramsci wrote that it was necessary to compile an inventory of the
infinity of traces that constitute a conception of the world (Q11§12; 1971, 323/4), he
could have added that the inventory should include a column called ‘value’. But what is
crucial to recognize is that all his evaluations, taken together, do not add up to a
systematic axiology or theory of value. Gramsci never claimed to produce such a thing,
and he did not.
Yet Marx did. Now Marx’s theory is not, strictly speaking, a work of axiology, but it is
nothing if not a theory of value*/one that meant an enormous amount to Gramsci.1
How so?
1. Gramsci’s noneconomic valuations and Marx’s value theory are indeed different: it is
undeniable that Gramsci’s ‘valuations’ are more philological and political than economic in
character. Yet they are also intensely interrelated in the Prison Notebooks. Gramsci’s Notebooks
are often axiological in tone and substance, yet they are also grounded, as I argue here, in Marx’s
theory of value. It would be helpful to analyze the precise relationship between Gramsci’s
reading and appropriation of Marx’s theory of value, on the one hand, and his own noneconomic,
philological valuations, on the other. But this task lies beyond the scope of this essay.
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In the first place, Gramsci took it as axiomatic that value originates in labor and
that what distinguishes capitalism as a mode of production is the sale of labor power
for the production and sale of commodities. Gramsci explains repeatedly in his Prison
Notebooks that this alone comprises the basis of ‘critical economy’, as he refers to
Marxist political economy (in contradistinction to ‘economic science’, which is non-
Marxist economics).
When can one speak of a beginning to economic science? . . . [F]rom the time
that the discovery was made that it is not gold that constitutes wealth . . . but
labour . . . This concept [i.e., labor] . . . cannot be submerged into the more
generic one of industry and activity but must instead be placed firmly in that
human activity which is equally necessary in any social form. This enrichment
has been accomplished by critical economy. (Q10II§25; 1995, 164/5)
So what we call ‘economics’ today begins with Adam Smith and David Ricardo, a point
with which many economists would agree with Gramsci. Yet Gramsci identifies the
starting point to their analyses as value, which Smith and Ricardo found rooted in
labor.2 Moreover, Gramsci contends that the insights of Smith and Ricardo, however
fundamental, remained only latent until Marx’s ‘‘enrichment’’ (note the evaluation)
of economic thought.3 For Gramsci, as for Marx, the key transformation came via
Marx’s distinction between labor power and mere ‘‘industry and activity.’’ The latter
category*/the sparks flying off the hammer and anvil, the noise and bustle of a
marketplace*/was for Smith and Ricardo the essence of economic life and the source
of value. Marx’s accomplishment was to distinguish between these general aspects of
living productive activity, on the one hand, and labor power as a commodity, on the
other, and to show how the achievement of this separation was fundamental to
capitalist social relations.
This is admittedly only a concise summary of one fragment, but it provides a
perspicacious view of Gramsci in his theoretical workshop. Notwithstanding his
famous interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution as a ‘‘revolution against Capital’’
(1917, 34/7), Gramsci took Capital for granted. Frequent citations in his notes on
2. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith writes: ‘‘The value of any commodity . . . to the person
who possesses it, and who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other
commodities, is equal to the quantity of labor which it enables him to purchase or command.
Labor, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities’’ (Smith
2003, 43). Ricardo begins his Principles of Political Economy with Smith’s discussion of value,
writing: ‘‘If the quantity of labor realised in commodities regulate their exchangeable value,
every increase of the quantity of labor must augment the value of that commodity on which it is
exercised, as every diminution must lower it’’ (2004, 7). To be sure, their ‘labor theory of value’
is not at all the same as Marx’s (see Karatani 2005, 193/5, 244).
3. Gramsci felt that Marxist and non-Marxist economic thought addressed the same problems
using different concepts and languages: ‘‘if one wishes to defend the critical conception of
economics, one must systematically insist on the fact that orthodox economics does deal with
the same problems, albeit in another language, demonstrating this identity of the problems
being treated and demonstrating that the critical solution is the superior one’’ (Q10§20; 1995,
183/4). Yet ‘economic science’ lacks a theory of value in the Marxist sense. Their different
‘languages’ are mutually intelligible for this reason. The implication is that the superiority of
‘critical economy’ must be demonstrated through value theory.
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Marxist economics indicate his abiding interest in the three volumes of Marx’s
Theories of Surplus Value (see Q8§162, Q10II§37ii, Q10II§38i).4 Avowing Marx’s theory
of value as his starting point, Gramsci follows Marx not only methodologically but
substantively. Consider Gramsci’s brief note on the ‘‘Unity in the constituent
elements of Marxism’’ (Q7§18; 1971, 402/3), one of several where he defines
Marxism’s core qualities. There he posits that the foundation of Marxism lies in ‘‘the
dialectical development of the contradictions between man [sic] and matter
(nature*/material forces of production).’’ Gramsci discerns three constitutive
elements within this dialectical development: the economic, political, and philoso-
phical. Regarding the first, he writes, ‘‘In economics the unitary centre is value, alias
the relationship between the worker and the industrial productive forces (those who
deny the theory fall into crass vulgar materialism by posing machines in
themselves*/as constant and technical capital*/as producers of value independent
of the man who runs them)’’ (Q7§18; 1971, 402/3).5 He thus saw value as the ‘‘unitary
center,’’ the fluid foundation of economics, and central to the tripartite unfolding of
the manifold engagements of living labor with the world. His parenthetical critique
underscores his emphasis on value for understanding social relations. Those who
believe that profit comes from machines and thus fail to see that surplus value
derives from labor are charged with, of all things, vulgar materialism. Not the usual
critique*/and one that only makes sense if Gramsci’s ‘unitary center’ is value as
theorized by Marx.6
2
Gramsci’s references to value are not all axiological or theoretical. In the pre-prison
writings, value arises as a core economic concept used to discuss the concrete
challenges facing the Italian communists*/for instance, in negotiating wages (i.e.,
4. Gramsci seems to have read the Theories of Surplus Value as edited and published by Karl
Kautsky between 1905 and 1910.
5. Regarding this same passage, Bob Jessop (1997) writes: ‘‘Although Gramsci saw the discipline
of economics as being largely concerned with ‘value’, he also located economic problems in
their broader political, intellectual, and moral context.’’ This statement is a non sequitur. Marx’s
value theory presumes that economic problems are located within these contexts.
6. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci calls for ‘universalizing’ Ricardo’s discoveries*/presumably
including the labor theory of value*/through a critical historicism (Q10II§9; 1971, 400/1). Here,
too, he explicitly follows Marx’s lead, for Marx’s theory of value was built in part by critically
historicizing the concept of ‘value’ in Theories of Surplus Value. Gramsci emphasizes this debt
to Marx. Commenting upon the basic requirements for an excellent economic textbook, Gramsci
writes, ‘‘Any textbook of economic science cannot be divorced from a course in the history of
economic doctrines. The so-called fourth volume of the Critique of Political Economy [i.e.,
Marx’s Theories of Surplus Value] is in fact a history of economic doctrines . . . The whole
conception of critical economy is historicist (which does not mean that it should be confused
with the so-called historical school of economics) and its theoretical treatment cannot be
disentangled from a history of economic science’’ (Q10II§37ii; 1995, 178). Gramsci’s
parenthetical comment is a useful reminder that his ‘absolute historicism’ should not be
confused with empiricism.
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the money price paid for labor power).7 Likewise in his Prison Notebooks, value forms
the crucial basis for his conception of Fordism (which Gramsci relates to uneven
international extraction of surplus value) and his criticism of the conventional theory
of the economic crisis of the 1930s (Gramsci 1995, sections 3 and 4).8 Consider, for
instance, his basic analytical approach to Fordism. In a series of notes
(Q10II§31/41vii; 1995, 424/35) that have not, perhaps, received the attention they
deserve, Gramsci situates his analysis of Fordism against a critique of Croce’s
misreading of Marx’s theory of value. Consider the first paragraph of Q10II33 (1995,
428/9).
A fundamental flaw is to be noted in Croce’s essay on the tendential fall in
the rate of profit. This problem had already been formulated in the first
volume of the Critique of Political Economy [i.e., Marx’s Capital], where
relative surplus value and technical progress are spoken of being precisely
the cause of relative surplus value; in the same point it is observed how a
contradiction arises in this process, i.e. while on the one hand technical
progress allows an expansion of relative surplus value, on the other it
determines, by means of the change it introduces into the composition of
capital, a tendential fall in the rate of profit which is then demonstrated in
Volume III of [Capital]. To the theory expounded in Volume III, Croce
presents the treatment contained in Volume I as an objection. In other words
he expounds as an objection to the tendential law of the fall in the rate of
profit the demonstration of the existence of a relative surplus value due to
technical progress, without however even once mentioning Volume I, as if
the objection had sprung from his brain, or was even the consequence of
good sound sense. (However the texts of the Critique of Political Economy
will have to be looked at again before putting forward this criticism of
Croce’s objection, a precaution which moreover must be understood for all
these notes, which have been written to a very large extent on the basis of
memory.)
Gramsci thus emphatically opposes Croce’s reading with an interpretation of Capital
that presumes the validity of Marx’s value theory. And he stresses the need to return
to the three volumes of Capital to develop his critique of Croce. I cite this passage
because only a few notes later in the same notebook, Gramsci connects his critique of
Croce’s reading of Marx to his analysis of Fordism. He writes that the ‘‘tendential fall
7. For instance, analyzing the factory councils, Gramsci writes, ‘‘The rise of the [factory]
delegates shows that negotiation about prices in the context of bourgeois competition, and
administration of the means of production and masses of men, are two different functions. The
first has what might be called a commercial objective: it consists in establishing the value of the
labour of a category of workers, on a given bourgeois market, in order to sell it at the best
possible price (a function exercised by the trade unions). The second has the potential objective
of preparing men, bodies and concepts, through a continuous pre-revolutionary process of
scrutiny, so that they may be equipped to replace the employer’s authority in the factory and
impose a new discipline on social life’’ (1919a, 114/5; my emphasis).
8. For interpretations of Gramsci as an economist, see Boothman (1991) and Cavallaro (1997).
More recently, Mann (2009) offers a Gramscian reading of the present economic crisis; Ruccio
(2009) discusses Gramsci’s relation to economics and globalization; Kra¨tke (1997, and
forthcoming) criticizes the deemphasis of political economy in Gramscian studies.
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in the rate of profit . . . ought to be studied on the basis of Taylorism and Fordism. Are
these not two methods of work and production that represent the progressive
attempts to overcome the tendential law, getting around it by multiplying the
variables in the conditions of the progressive rise in constant capital? (Q10II§41vii;
1995, 433). His key observation here is that Fordism is a project that attempts to
address the tendential fall in the rate of profit (and specifically the crisis of the
1930s). Notwithstanding Gramsci’s admiration for Fordism*/he recognized its
dynamism and anticipated its success*/he also saw that it would fail to resolve the
underlying dynamic that gave rise to it: that is, competition-driven technical progress
that leads to a crisis of capital accumulation. Gramsci’s insight is all the more
remarkable given that he wrote these lines while shut off from the world*/and well
before Fordism’s consolidation as such! His ability to diagnose Fordism in these terms
is only possible because, as he stresses, he is applying the basic framework provided
by Capital to understand dynamic historical conditions. To which we might add that
Gramsci takes one further step in relating these changing conditions to the changing
forms of subjectivity: gender relations, religion, ‘‘the modification of the traditional
type of worker,’’ and so on. This is a substantial, creative accomplishment. Yet again,
the framework for his analysis of Fordism, he takes pains to specify, is Marx’s.
These illustrations underscore that Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks treat Marx’s theory
of value as fundamental to an analysis of capitalism and the challenge of winning
communist hegemony. This was already the case by 1919. That year, Gramsci’s pre-
prison writings indicate that he saw that any substantial political threat to capital
would require challenging value as such. Gramsci’s most important statements to this
effect appear in an essay entitled ‘‘The Problem of Power,’’ published in L’Ordine
Nuovo (1919b). There Gramsci describes ‘‘the source of bourgeois power’’ as rooted
in ‘‘the formation of surplus-value.’’ This is, of course, a crystallization of volume 1 of
Capital, from which Gramsci draws a key political lesson: the peasantry and
proletariat must join to conduct a positive form of economic ‘‘sabotage’’ to attack
the core of capitalist class power. In a passage describing the accomplishments of the
corporative movement, he writes:
The corporative movement . . . has concentrated a mass of nearly six million
Italian workers . . . It has banished the ‘free’ worker from the economic
scene, and so paralysed the capitalist labour market. The conquest of the
8-hour day and a minimum wage are the outcome of this state of affairs in
the labour market. The capitalist order of production has been rocked to its
foundations by these achievements; the ‘freedom’ to exploit, to extract
surplus-value from labour-power (profit for the capitalist, rent to
the landowner, taxes to the State, tribute to the newspapers and hired
killers of the big banks), has been limited and placed under the*/albeit
indirect*/control of the proletariat. The economic foundations of capitalist
organization, which reaches its apex in the bureaucratic-parliamentary
State, have been destroyed, through the sabotage of the primary source of
capitalist power: the freedom to extract surplus-value. (131)
Of course, Gramsci’s claim that the ‘‘economic foundations of capitalist
organization . . . have been destroyed’’ is hyperbole. This passage is taken from an
editorial intended equally to evaluate and motivate, one with less pessimism of
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intellect than optimism of will. But what is critical here is that Gramsci defines ‘‘the
economic foundations of capitalist organization’’ by ‘‘the freedom to extract surplus-
value.’’ Today Gramsci is best known as a theorist of hegemony. I know of no clearer
statement than this where he specifies capitalist hegemony’s economic basis. And it
is a restatement of Marx’s theory of value.
3
To conclude, the answer is yes: Gramsci was a Marxist. So perhaps those smiling
geographers were right to smile and walk out on Professor Finocchiaro? I am not so
sure. After all, the arguments he put forth still stand: which is to say that there are
very few substantive ways to interpret Gramsci as a Marxist, and the most
important*/on the question of value*/has not been emphasized. If this is correct,
then an interesting question arises. Why has the fact that Gramsci’s theory of
hegemony is grounded in Marx’s critique of political economy been so consistently
deemphasized or ignored?
Let me propose the following. In a common reading of Gramsci, we find the
equations Marxeconomism while Gramscihegemony (i.e., antieconomism). But
this is a false opposition. Some readers of Gramsci have avoided all traces of
‘economism’ in the Prison Notebooks, even suggesting that his Marxism disavowed
economic analysis. Without a doubt, Gramsci aimed at destroying economism (Wolff
1989, 50). Yet just because he was severely critical of Marxist economism does not
mean that he was not a Marxist economist. On the contrary, it only means that he saw
economism as a distortion of Marx’s economic (value) theory*/and rightly so. Indeed,
Gramsci’s novel contributions to Marxism presuppose Marx’s critique of political
economy. Thus, his reflections on Marxist economics bring us back to its essential
insights. He was critical of Marxism for its lack of rigor and exactness in economic
analysis (Q15§43; 1995, 175). To be Gramscian, then, we should apply the same rigor
to his thought.
Some readers of Gramsci have suggested that he simply overlooked political
economy in his Notebooks. For instance, in the introduction to a symposium on
Joseph Buttigieg’s translation of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, David Ruccio argues:
[F]or all their richness . . . political economy appears to be largely overlooked.
It’s not that Gramsci was uninterested in economics . . . But it appears that . . .
Gramsci was drawn to the concerns raised in some Marxist texts and not
others. The fact that he focused his attention on questions of ideology,
hegemony, and the state and not on other questions, such as those suggested
by commodity fetishism, the appropriation of surplus-value, and the accu-
mulation of capital, forces us to recognize that, while Gramsci opens up and
adds to one wing of the Marxian tradition, much work remains to be done to
integrate his insights into other wings of that tradition. (2006, 5/6)9
9. Thanks to Kenan Erc¸el for drawing my attention to this passage.
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I hope that it is now clear that this generalization was too hasty. In a subsequent
paper, Ruccio (2009) returns to Gramsci to reconsider class. I would argue that
Gramsci’s originality partly concerns his reinvigoration of Marx’s theory of class*/in a
way that presupposes Marx’s value theory as the framework. For Marx, value relations
in capitalism are class relations and vice versa. Gramsci’s careful commentary on
social groups (including ‘subaltern social groups’) in the Prison Notebooks provides an
analysis of class, albeit one that never firmly fixes the boundaries around classes but
rather sees within each class formation an ensemble of overlapping social groups. His
approach is emphatically not a pluralism, but rather an open Marxism rooted in
analysis of complex class processes. This is the real meaning of Gramsci’s emphasis on
value for class analysis: he affirms that the proletariat is defined as such by its place
vis-a`-vis value form*/as a ‘subaltern social group’*/and yet also shows that this is not
the end of the story.
Earlier I noted that Finocchiaro’s question seemed to foreclose the possibility that
Gramsci may have been a Marxist on political grounds. Clearly Gramsci’s argument that
the value of revolutionary activities should be measured against their contribution to
the ‘‘reorganization of the world economy’’ is unmistakably Marxist in this sense; we
could therefore reply to Finocchiaro’s question on this basis. This would be, I think, the
standard reply. Yet to do so may well presuppose a coherence to the concept of ‘Marxist
politics’ that is less real than imagined. Gramsci’s writings on economics, I suggest, are
useful in illuminating the complications of putting Marxist theory to work politically. As
is well known, in the conclusion to Capital, Marx anticipated the end of capitalism as a
result of the intensification of capital’s own internal contradictions. Gramsci called the
Bolshevik revolution a ‘‘revolution against Capital’’ (1917, 34/7) because Russia won its
revolution via Lenin’s vanguardist seizure of a weakened state, not because of the
development of contradictions in capitalism. If we take Gramsci’s interpretation to be
correct, then the subsequent rise of Stalinism represented a sort of counterrevolution
against Capital; like all counterrevolutions, it did not reinstate what came earlier.
Marx’s critique of capitalism in Capital had no real meaning for Stalin*/but it did for
Gramsci. Today, in the wake of the Stalinist nightmare, our reading of Gramsci must
coincide with a return to Capital and thus to Marx’s theory of value.
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